THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

He will make this decision either where he feels that the full amount of
the debt will not be collectible when it falls due, where he wants the benefit of
some money before the obligation matures, or because he feels that by not
forcing payment in full he will be able to continue a profitable business relationship with the debtor.
It appears that the unrealistic concept of a "gift in the commercial world"
has been abandoned, although it is true that the Jacobson decision did not expressly overrule the American Dental case.4 If some satisfactory limitation of
the gift concept is devised, it may be applicable to some cases. However, it is not
likely that such a limitation will be formulated. If so, the answer to the question
of when the cancellation of indebtedness results in taxable income is again to be
found in the principle of the Kirby case and the two satellite concepts, constructed about reduction in purchase price and insolvency, that were developed
around that principle prior to the American Dental decision.
gains.41

RIGHTS OF BENEFICIARIES UNDER FACILITY
OF PAYMENT CLAUSES
The plaintiff was the named beneficiary of four small industrial insurance policies which contained facility of payment clauses. The clauses provided that "[ilf
the Beneficiary does not surrender this policy with due proof of death within 30
days after death of the insured,... the death benefit will, upon surrender of

this Policy with due proof of death, be paid to the executor or administrator of
the Insured, but.., the Company may ... pay the benefit to any relative by
blood or connection by marriage.., or to any person appearing to the Company to be equitably entitled... because of having incurred expense for...
medical attention or burial of the Insured." The plaintiff, not possessing the
policies, was unable to present them for payment within the 3o-day period; she
ultimately brought suit against the insurer and the person retaining the policies
-the insured's widow. The company interpleaded the plaintiff, the widow, and
the administrator, and paid the proceeds of the policies into court. It was held
that upon the expiration of the initial 3o-day period the beneficiary assumed a
status under the facility of payment clause similar to that of any other person
to whom the insurer might have elected to pay the benefits. The plaintiff accordingly had no right to compel payment, and since the insurer had failed to
elect a recipient of the proceeds, only the administrator had a right to receive
payment. Matejicska v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
Industrial insurance policies pay benefits averaging about $250; premiums
41 Compare

Haden Co. v. Com'r, 118 F. 2d 285 (C.C.A. 5th,

1941),

cert. den. 314 U.S.
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(1941) (decided before the American Dental case and holding that because the cancellation of

indebtedness benefited the creditor, the cancellation did not constitute a gift).
4*Justice Rutledge, concurring with the majority, was of the opinion that the two cases
were inconsistent. Com'r v. Jacobson, 69 S. Ct. 358, 370 (1949).
x335 II1. App. 81, 8o N.E. 2d 278 (1948).
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are usually collected weekly. Such protection is purchased by members of low
income groups especially to cover funeral costs and the last expenses of the insured.2 The facility of payment clause, which invariably appears in industrial
policies, constitutes an appointment by the parties to an insurance contract of
persons or classes of persons who may receive payment of the benefits. From
the insurer's viewpoint, the purpose of these clauses is to permit prompt payment, to protect itself in making such payment, to avoid the delay attendant
upon the administration of the insured's estate, and to remove the possibility
of litigation between claimants and the insurer.3 The social purpose of the
clause is to meet such exigencies as usually arise in case of death,4 and to eliminate the time and expense necessary for the administration of the estate, especially where there is no estate other than the proceeds of the policies. Policies
similar to the instrument in the instant case generally include a named beneficiary as well as the facility of payment clause; others, lacking a beneficiary,
authorize payment to the executor or administrator of the insured's estate if no
election to pay is made under the clause; still other forms of policies include all
potential recipients of benefits under the facility of payment clause.s
The insurer has an option in deciding whether to make payment and to
whom payment will be made under the facility of payment clause even though
the policy names a beneficiary.6 Election and payment, if made in good faith,
act to discharge the insurer from further liability under the contract of insurance.7 In two Pennsylvania cases, however, the court treated the facility of
payment clause as mere surplusage and concluded that good faith payment to
'Williams, Industrial Policies-Facility of Payment Clause, i8 Neb. L. Bull. ioo (1939);
see Beard v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 326 Pa. 43o , 192 Atl. 41x (I937); Pioneer Trust
&Savings Bank v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 278 Ill. App. 13 (x934); Zornow v. Prudential
Ins. Co., 2o App. Div. 339, 206 N.Y. Supp. 92 (1924).
3 Williams, op. cit. supra note 2; Fuller, The Special Nature of the Wage Earner's Life Insurance Problem, 2 Law & Contemp. Prob. io, 29 (1935). For judicial recognition of insurer's
purpose in including the facility of payment clause in industrial insurance, see Uptegrove v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., i45 Neb. 51, i5 N.W. 2d 22o (i944); Bragdon v. Prudential Ins.
Co., io9 Ind. App. 278, 34 N.E. 2d 173 (1941); Zoruow v. Prudential Ins. Co., 21o App. Div.
339, 2o6 N.Y. Supp. 92 (1924); Bishop v. Prudential Ins. Co., 217 Ill. App. 112 (1920).

'Prudential Ins. Co. v. Tomes, 45 F. Supp. 353 (D.C. Neb., 1942); Pioneer Trust & Savings
Bank v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 278 Ill. App. 11,3 (2934); Dorsey v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 145 So. 304 (La. App., 1933); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Howell, z44 Okla. i66, 289 Pac. 734
(930).
5See The Facility of Payment Clause in Industrial Life Insurance Policies, 32 Col. L. Rev.
1185, 1186 (1932).
6Jenkins v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 113 Colo. 68, i55 P. 2d 772 (i944); Turner v. Prudential Ins. Co., 15o Kan. 899, 96 P. 2d 641 (i939); Moldovan v. John Hancock Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 224 S.W. 2d 541 (Mo. App., 1939); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Brock, 48 App. D.C. 4
(z918).
7Minuto v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 58 R.I. 71, i91 Atl. 117 (1937) (company held not
warranted in paying executor without properly investigating who had actually paid funeral
expenses); Dorsey v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 145 So. 304 (La. App., 1933); In re O'Neill's
Estate, 243 N.Y. Misc. 69, 255 N.Y. Supp. 767 (1932); Bishop v. Prudential Ins. Co., 217 Ill.
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one not the designated beneficiary did not relieve the insurer of liability to the
named beneficiary. s
The courts are in general agreement that those persons who are mentioned
only in the facility of payment clause have no right to enforce payment.9 An
impressive majority of cases indicate that the named beneficiary, rather than
the administrator of the insured's estate or any other claimant, has the exclusive right to maintain an action for the proceeds of the policy when the insurer
fails to elect to pay anyone.' o A few distinguishable cases hold that the administrator may bring suit rather than the beneficiary.", Recognition of the
administrator by the courts as the only person who may enforce payment under
a facility of payment clause would defeat the social purpose of these policies; the
appointment of an administrator necessitates weeks of delay and expenditures
which may appreciably diminish the small estate represented in many instances
only by the policy.
Occasionally insurers fail to make payment because of belief that there are
two or more worthy claimants. While the insurers could relieve themselves from
liability by making an election of an eligible party under the clause, the companies sometimes wait to be sued and then interplead all claimants. The problem of selecting a proper recipient of benefits is thus delegated to the court.
Where the claimants in an interpleader action are the named beneficiary and
the executor or administrator of the insured's estate, the courts usually award
payment to the beneficiary.2 Indeed, it has been held that the propriety of the

beneficiary's claim in such circumstances is so apparent that interpleader will
not be allowed.X In interpleader proceedings the courts seek to determine who
8 Smith v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
politan Life Ins. Co., i99 Pa. 481, 49 Atl.
175 At]. 8.30 (,X934).
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Pa. 226, 71 Atl. xi (igo8); McNally v. Metro(x9oi); cf. Capuano v. Boghosian, 54 R.I. 489,

9 Morticians' Acceptance Co. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 321 Ill. App. 277, 53 N.E. 2d
30 (x944).; Vois v. Rutledge, 297 Ill. App. 383, 17 N.E. 2d 622 (1938); Craig v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 220 Mo. App. 913, 296 S.W. 209 (1927); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Chappell,
Tenn. 299, 269 S.W. 21 (1924).
x0Chandler v. American Life & Accident Ins. Co., 96 S.W. 2d 883 (Mo. App., 1936);
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Capuano v. Boghosian, 54 R.I. 489, 175 Atl. 830 (1934); Smooth v. Metropolitan Life Int. Co.,
157 So. 298 (La. App., 1934); French v. Lanham, 57 F. 2d 422 (App. D.C., 1932); Washington
Fidelity National Ins. Co. v. Heard, 148 Okla. 294, 298 Pac. 622 (i93i).
11Plummer v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 229 Mo. App. 638, 8i S.W. 2d 453 (1935) (named
beneficiary was insured's divorced husband who had deserted her ten years previously);
Schlereth v. Neely, 285 S.W. i68 (Mo. App., 1926) (heirs of predeceased beneficiary have no
rights to compel payment as against administrator of the estate); McCarthy v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., i 62 Mass. 254, 38 N.E. 435 (1894) (insurer had already made a valid election
to pay when beneficiary brought suit).
"1Jenkins v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 113 Colo. 68, 155 P. 2d 772 (i944); Butler v.
Fowler, i88 S.W. 2d 612 (Tenn. App., x944); Turner v. Prudential Ins. Co., i5o Kan. 899, 96
P. 2d 641 (i939); Pashuck v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 124 Pa. Super. Ct. 4o6, i88 Atl. 614
(1936); Ogletree v. Hutchinson, 126 Ga. 454, 55 S.E. 179 (i9o6).
X3Golden v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 35 App. Div. 569, 55 N.Y. Supp. 143 (1898); cf.
Sampson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 36 Pa. Co. Ct. 481 (1909) (mother and beneficiary
interpleaded).
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is equitably entitled to payment. One who has paid the funeral expenses, a
creditor of the insured, or a person who supported the insured prior to his death
has such an equity.4

In litigation between beneficiaries or equitable claimants and those who have
in fact received payment, the courts have held that the one chosen by the company to receive payment does not become vested with absolute ownership of
the benefits but holds as agent or trustee for the party ultimately entitled to
the proceeds.s Generally, a beneficiary named in the policy, or the estate of the
insured if no beneficiary is named, may recover proceeds paid under the facility
of payment clause if it can be shown that the recipient has no beneficial interest
in the payments. The administrator, if paid, may be held to retain the funds for
the use of the named beneficiary.x6 The administrator may also be held to retain
part of the proceeds for one equitably entitled thereto."7 A person receiving payment from the insurer may be required to pay any residue beyond the extent of
his equitable interest to the beneficiary, or lacking the latter, to the estate. 8
Under the particular facility of payment clause in the instant case, the company could not exercise its option to choose a relative or one equitably entitled
to receive payment until after an initial 3o-day period.'9 The usual facility of
payment clause contains no such 3o-day proviso. This restriction on the exercise
of the insurer's option is apparently included for the benefit of the beneficiary
since during the period the insurer is precluded from making payment to anyone
other than the beneficiary. When the period has elapsed, the parties should occupy the same position as under the usual facility of payment clause.2° If the
insurer does not exercise its option under the clause after the initial period has
expired-a privilege which is lost after suit has been initiated to compel payX4Brown v. Ehlers, i3o Neb. 918, 267 N.W. i56 (1936); Bojczuk v. Skradski, 137 Kan. 4,
19 P. 2d 468 (1933); Ellis v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 3 S.W. 2d 397 (Mo. App., 1928). See

The Facility of Payment Clause in Industrial Insurance, 14 Tulane L. Rev. 114, 118 (1939)Is Lutostanski v. Lutostansli,
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Conn. 471, 18i Atl. 533 (1935); In re Van Pelt's Estate,

153 N.Y. Misc. 155, 275 N.Y. Supp. 317 (i934); Smith v. Massie, 93 Ind. App. 582, 179 N.E.
20 (i931); Blanchett v. Willis, i61 S.C. 83, 159 S.E. 469 ('93'); Ogletree v. Hutchinson, 126

Ga. 454, 55 S.E. 179 (19o6).
,6 French v. Lanham, 57 F. 2d 422 (App. D.C., 1932).
In re Grasso's Estate, 178 N.Y. Misc. 114, 34 N.Y.S. 2d 58 (i94i).
v. Prudential Ins. Co., io9 Ind. App. 278, 34 N.E. 2d 173 (1941); Apps v. Braun,
279 Mich. 221, 271 N.W. 739 (1937).
17

X8Bragdon

x9Lain v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 388 Ill. 576, 58 N.E. 2d 587 (1944), construing the
same clause held that the beneficiary has a vested right if he produces the policies and proof
of death within 30 days of insured's death. At the expiration of that period, if the beneficiary
has not delivered the policies to the insurer, the latter may exercise its option under the
facility of payment clause.
20 The opinion of the court in the instant case seems to place a premium on the ability of
the beneficiary to deliver up the policies within a month of the insured's death. This appears
arbitrary, for the company may easily verify the beneficiary's claim for payment whether or
not the beneficiary possesses the policies.
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ment"-the clause has no effect on the rights of the parties, and the instrument
is to be construed as if the facility of payment clause were not included. 2 Thus
if the beneficiary has not claimed payment within the 30 days, and if the company has not exercised its option after the period has expired, only the beneficiary should have a right to institute proceedings to recover the proceeds of the
policy. He should occupy the same status under these circumstances as the beneficiary under any ordinary policy of insurance. It follows that once proceedings
were instituted, the beneficiary's right to payment should have been recognized
as vested.
Consideration of the intention of the insured, the rights of the beneficiary
under ordinary life insurance, and the purposes of small industrial policies,
point to the need for recognition by the courts of a vested claim in the named
beneficiary, subject to being divested upon payment by the insurer to one who
has already supplied funds to accomplish the task for which the proceeds of the
policy were intended. Recognition by the courts of a right of action in the beneficiary may well be an inducement to prompt payment and tend to restore the
advantages to the insured's estate and loved ones which can arise from the inclusion of facility of payment clauses in industrial insurance policies.2
APPLICATION OF STRIKE SUIT STATUTES IN
FEDERAL COURTS
The plaintiff, owning a fraction of one per cent of the stock in a Delaware
corporation, filed, on diversity grounds, a derivative suit in a New Jersey federal
district court against the corporation's officers and directors., Before the determination of the suit, the New Jersey legislature passed a law requiring as a
condition precedent to a derivative action that a plaintiff hold shares either
worth $50,000 or constituting five per cent of the value of all outstanding

shares.2 Otherwise, the corporation might require that the complainant give
security for "reasonable expenses," including counsel fees incurred by the cor" Prudential Ins. Co. v. McMahon, 6o R.I. 446, i99 Atl. 305 (1938); Pashuck v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 124 Pa. Super. Ct. 4o6, i88 Atl. 614 (1936); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Tutalo,
55 R.I. 16o, 178 AtI. 859 (1935); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Godfrey, 75 N.J. Eq. 484, 72 Atl. 456
(igog); Floyd v. Prudential Ins. Co., 72 Mo. App. 455 (1897). But see Slingerland v. Prudential
Ins. Co., 94 N.J.L. 532, ino Atl. 913 (1920) (mere assertion of a claim by beneficiary or administrator does not terminate company's right to make payment under the facility of payment clause).
2 Uptegrove v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 145 Neb. 5I, I5 N.W. 2d 220 (I944); Pashuck
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 124 Pa. Super. Ct. 4o6, 188 Atl. 614 (1936); In re O'Neill's Estate, r43 N.Y. Misc. 69, 255 N.Y. Supp. 767 (1932); Williams v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
233 S.W. 248

'3 For

(Mo. App.,

1921).

a discussion of how the facility of payment clause is actually administered by the
companies see Fuller, The Special Nature of the Wage Earner's Life Insurance Problem, 2 Law
& Contemp. Prob. 10, 30 (193s).
'See Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corporation, 7 F.R.D. 352 (i947).
N.J. Rev. Stat. (Supp., 1947) tit. 14, c. 3, §§ 15, 17.

